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Abstract
This paper reviews work on case grammars, primarily from the
perspective of their use in computer natural language
understanding systems. A distinction between surface cases and
deep cases in drawn. Deep cases are then discussed in relation
to grammatical explanation and representation of meaning. Four
representative approaches to theories of case structures are
described.
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Deep Case Systems
For Language Understanding
This paper examines the linguistic notion of case as it
applies to natural language understanding. Case theory suggests
an approach to the representation of sentence meaning and is
important in accounting for the way the structure of sentences
relates to those meanings. Most AI natural language systems make
use of these ideas in some form (Bruce, 1975) and the concepts
relate closely to the idea of schemata (Rumelhart, 1980) as
applied in theories of reading. Applications of case theory have
appeared in intelligent systems for such diverse areas as medical
diagnosis (Chokhani, 1973; Kulikowski & Weiss, 1971) and speech
understanding (Baranofsky, 1974; Nash-Webber, 1975). Research
has addressed issues of efficiency, flexibility, scope, and grain
(Bobrow & Winograd, 1977; Moore & Newell, 1973; Winograd, 1975).
The notion of "case" has been used to refer to several
related concepts. Traditionally, it has meant the classification
of nouns according to their syntactic role in a sentence,
signalled by various inflected forms. In English, only pronouns
have these case inflections. For instance, the first person
singular pronoun is "I" (nominative case), "me" (accusative/
objective case), or "my" (genitive/possessive case)
according to its use as subject, object, or possessive article.
In languages such as Greek, all nouns are given affixes which
indicate their case.
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The idea of a direct relationship between inflections and
cases is one kind of case, also called "surface" or "syntactic
level" case. For example, in the sentence
(1) Susan kicked the football with her foot.
each NP has a syntactic role:
* Subject: Susan
* Direct object: the football
* Object of the prepositon with: her foot
However, in understanding language, it is not sufficient to
recognize the syntactic role of noun phrases (NPs). One would
also like to know the semantic role each NP plays in the meaning
of the sentence. Using the structural features together with
lexical, morphological, and semantic information it is possible
to determine that sentence (1) describes an event of kicking in
which:
0 Susan is the kicker, the agent;
* the football is the kickee, the object;
* her foot is used to perform the kicking, the
instrument.
The latter analysis suggests another sense of "case" (also
called "deep case," "semantic case," or "theta role"), namely, a
categorization of noun phrases according to their conceptual
roles in the action described by a sentence. Conceptual roles
are independent of the particular verb or predicate being
expressed. The agent case, then, is a generalization of many
ideas: kicker, reader, walker, and dancer; i.e., one who
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performs an action. Because deep cases describe meanings,
rather than the words and structure that express those
meanings, they are claimed to be language independent. Much of
the discussion of deep cases has focused on identifying a small
number of these conceptual roles which can be used for describing
the meaning of any sentence. A set of deep cases is then called
a "case system."
Surface Cases
One way to categorize nouns is by their endings or
inflections. For the purposes of natural language processing, it
is more useful to define surface case as a general syntactic
categorization of noun phrases. Another way to think of surface
case is as a property that is assigned to an NP, which is
manifested in the sentence as a syntactic marker or signal,
called a case marker.
Various linguistic elements can be case markers. The
primary one is the case-affix, i.e., an ending attached to a noun
form. Many would consider that prepositions (or postpositions)
serve a similar function. Word order, as in English, can also be
viewed as a case marker. In addition, case assignment interacts
with such features as gender and definiteness of the noun phrase.
This vew of case, then, generalizes the notion of surface case
from simple noun inflections to a property which all NPs have and
which may be expressed with word endings, word order, or other
structural features.
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How many distinct surface cases are there? One way to
determine this is to consider a language in which cases are
expressed by nominal inflections. In Latin, for example, five or
six cases are usually distinguished: nominative, accusative,
genitive, dative, ablative, and sometimes vocative.
But simply identifying surface cases is not that helpful in
processing natural language, since surface cases are merely
signals for which deep case to assign. In other words, for each
conceptual role, one needs to account for the case markers that
identify it. The degree to which a case based theory can account
for inguistic behavior depends upon the way the cases mediate
between surface forms and conceptual structures. The remaining
discussion focusses on conceptual structures, or deep cases.
Deep Cases and Grammatical Explanation
The notion of deep cases is not new. For instance,
Sonnencheins's demand that cases "denote categories of meaning"
(see Jespersen, 1965) is in effect a statement that there are two
levels of cases, the surface level indicated by case-affixes and
a deeper level which may be common to more than one language.
Fillmore (1968, pp. 2-3) presents a good argument for the
universality of deep cases in natural language, saying that:
What is needed is a conception of base structure in
which case relationships are primitive terms of the
theory and in which such concepts as "subject" and
"direct object" are missing. The latter are regarded
as proper only to the surface structure of some (but
possibly not all) languages.
Because deep cases focus on (conceptual) events rather than
on syntactic constructions, they can help explain the relative
"acceptability" of certain sentences. For example, one concept
of the event "kicking," is that in (1). This concept
encompasses such notions as agent, object, instrument, location,
and so on. Knowledge of this concept, along with an
understanding of concepts such as "football" and "foot," give an
account of how to understand (1). At the same time it leads one
to question sentences such as:
(2) Susan kicked the new idea.
(3) Susan kicked.
(4) Susan and her foot kicked the football.
Sentence (2) seems strange because the sense of "kick" used
here seems to require a concrete object. Sentence (3) seems
strange because the object of the kicking needs to be mentioned
explicitly. Cues from the discourse as to what was kicked (or an
intransitive interpretation of "kick") are needed to make the
sentence comprehensible. Sentence (4) is also odd because, while
either "Susan" or "her foot" or "Susan and Joe" could be the
subject of the sentence, it is difficult to conjoin objects that
play different roles in the meaning of the sentence.
These ideas can be formalized by postulating for each verb a
case frame consisting of two elements:
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* case structure. What are the case slots, or set of
cases which play a role in the event denoted by the
verb, e.g., a "kicking"? Which of these slots are
optional, which are obligatory?
* selection restrictions. What are the semantic
constraints on the objects which fill each slot in the
case structure?
Selection restrictions may vary from global constraints on
the use of a case with any predicate (e.g., "every agent must be
animate") to local constraints on the use of a case with a
particular predicate (e.g., "the object of 'spend' must be a
resource"). Thus, for kicking, one might infer a case frame with
the following slots and restrictions:
(5) [{agent}:animate object,
object:physical object,
{instrument} :physical object,
{source}:location,
{goall. location]
The curly brackets are used here to indicate that the
particular slot in the case structure is optional. This case
frame says among other things, that if the agent of the kicking
is described, it should be animate. Using an inanimate object
description would suggest an interpretation in which that object
is seen as animate. As discussed above, the prepositions and
word order in a sentence may indicate which case is intended for
each NP. If the indicated cases pass the appropriate selection
restrictions and if they correspond to the cases allowed by the
case structure then the sentence should be easy to understand.
Otherwise it can be considered ungrammatical or at least as
grounds to re-interpret the event.
Most language understanding systems use case frames or
equivalent mechanisms for semantic checking. A parser must check
that the features of nominal constituents in the sentence satisfy
the selection restrictions for the verb. The case frame may help
to disambiguate among senses of the verb; either the case
structure or the selection restrictions will distinguish the two
senses. Furthermore, the selection restrictions can help the
system identify anaphoric references.
For instance, consider sentence (1). The indicated cases
are [agent, object, instrument], each of which are present in (5)
and the required object case is present. Susan is animate; the
football and her foot are physical. Thus (1) can be easily
mapped into the case structure for "kick."
Sentence (2) also indicates an acceptable case structure,
[agent, object], but a new idea is not a physical object. Since
the selection restrictions for the object slot are violated, the
sentence is less easily mapped into the case frame and hence,
less comprehensible. In contrast, sentence (3) obeys the
selection restrictions of (5). Susan, the agent, is animate.
However, its indicated case structure, [agent], does not contain
the object case required by (5). Thus, it too, is problematic.
For sentence (4), the case structure seems to be
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[agent/instrument, object. While either the agent or the
instrument can be the subject of a kicking sentence, a case
cannot be assigned to them when they are conjoined.
In general, discourse information can significantly alter
the interpretation of a single sentence. If (2) were to follow a
discussion of Susan's invention which wouldn't work, then the
context might allow the "new idea" to be interpreted as a
physical object. Or, suppose one describes Susan running towards
a football, and then utters sentence (3). In that situation, one
could easily infer that the object is the football.
Notice that in neither of these situations has the case
structure or selection restrictions been violated, but, rather,
the context provides information, which is missing from the
sentence in isolation. Some language understanding systems allow
ellipsis of the obligatory slots in case structures, i.e., if
there is no filler, the system looks for nearby NPs to fill the
slot.
Deep Cases and Meaning Representation
Underlying our discussion is the idea that people have a
generic concept of an event such as kicking. Then, a sentence
such as (1) serves to describe a particular instance of such an
event. A formal representation of the concept of kicking can be
given by first defining a predicate, kicking*, which represents
the set of all events which are examples of kicking. The
expression,
Deep Case Systems
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(6) (Ex) [kicking* (x) J
could then be read as, "there is an event which is an instance of
kicking."
Usually, the kind of event is expressed as a verb, e.g., "to
kick." However, an event description can also be realized as a
noun phrase. One could say either "they prepared the meal" or
"their preparation of the meal." By choosing events as primary
entities, the semantic similarities among these phrases is
captured naturally.
An event description points out an event and also
distinguishes that event from other events of the same type by
specifying various properties, or relationships between objects
and the event. By asserting several propositions about the
event, sentence (1), for example, indicates which kicking is
being discussed. This set of propositions can be expressed as a
conjunction of binary relations:
(7) (Ex) [kicking* (x)
& agent (x, Susan)
& object (x, the football)
& instrument (x, her foot)
& time (x, past)]
These relations suggest a formalism for representing
sentence meaning. Some natural language understanding systems,
assuming a small number of these fixed relations, parse sentences
into their deep case structure rather than the traditional
surface structure parse (see Figures 1 and 2).
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Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.
---- - --- --- ----------
Because a class of verbs with related meanings can be used
to describe similar events, these verbs share aspects of their
case frames. For instance,
(8) Fred bought some pickles from Reuben.
(9) Reuben sold some pickles to Fred.
a case theory should capture the fact that sentences (8) and (9)
describe the same event from a different perspective. The
meaning of (s) could be represented as,
(10) (Ex) [exchange* (x)
& agent (x, Fred)
& goal (x, Fred)
& object (x, some pickles)
& source (x, Reuben)]
The meaning of (9) is similar, the only difference being
that its agent is Reuben. Notice that this account requires that
the subject have two deep cases. Jackendoff (1972, pp. 34-35),
uses similar examples to justify his claim that an NP can have
multiple deep cases.
Systems that make use of semantic similarities among verbs
are described in (Hendrix, Thompson, & Slocum, 1973; Norman,
Rumelhart, & the LNR Research Group, 1975). Identifying the case
generalizations for classes of verbs based on cross linguistic
evidence is the subject of ongoing research (Levin, et al.,
1985).
One formalism for representing case frames is that of
semantic networks. These were originally proposed by Quillian
(1968) to capture the objective aspect of word meaning. The
associative links between verb concepts (case frames) and real
world knowledge facilitate inferences made from sentence
meanings. Semantic network representations with structured
inheritance, e.g., KL-ONE (Brachman, 1979), allow information
about the syntactic and semantic regularities among verbs to be
sharea. Discussions of inferencing and case frame representation
can be found in Charniak (1975) and Simmons (1972).
One problem is that an indefinite number of properties can
be specified for a given event. For example,
(11) Because her arm hurt, Susan awkwardly kicked the
football to Mary in the park rather than throw it.
could be represented,
(12) (Ex) [kicking* (x)
& reason (x, her arm hurt)
& agent (x, Susan)
& object (x, the football)
& time (x, past)
& manner (x, awkward)
& goal (x, Mary)
& location (x, the park)
& preference (x, throw it)J
Some of these properties distinguish one event from another
while some merely modify, or provide additional information. For
instance, the thing Susan kicks seems more significant than the
fact that she kicks it awkwardly (her manner of kicking).
Unfortunately, the labeling of a property as "distinguishing" or
13
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"modifying" is rarely obvious. It is not difficult to imagine a
context in which the manner in which an event happens is the
distinguishing property and the object of the event is relatively
insignificant. The distinction among properties is sensitive to
the purpose of the speaker and the beliefs of both speaker and
hearer. Nevertheless, there is often a strong intuition that
certain properties belong with certain events. One could say
that properties vary in their degree of binding to an event and
that those properties which are most tightly bound are the deep
cases.
Case Systems
Despite the compromises which seem necessary to dichotomize
properties of events, there is a strong motivation to do so. By
postulating a set of binary relations which represent the
distinguishing properties of some generic event, one can define
events as structures-known configurations which facilitate
parsing and inference (Bruce, 1975; Martin, 1973; Norman, et al.,
1975; Schank, 1974, 1973; Shapiro, 1971; Winograd, 1975). The
complete set of deep cases available for describing events is
called a case system. This section analyzes four significant
case systems out of the many that have been proposed, in order to
convey a sense of the range of work in this area. A more complete
survey can be found in Bruce (1975).
Deep Case Relations
In classic papers, Fillmore (1968, 1971) has proposed a deep
structure theory based on cases. A sentence in this deep
structure consists of a modality plus a proposition:
(13) S -> M + P.
The modality constituent (M) includes negation, tense, mood,
and aspect. The proposition (P) is a tenseless structure
consisting of a verb and cases:
(14) P -> V + C + C2 + ... + Cn
where each Ci is a case name that generates either a noun phrase
or an embedded S. There is a global constraint on rules of the
form (14): At least one case must be present but no case may
appear twice. Rules (13) and (14) are argued to be universal.
Case markers are produced by the language specific Kasus element:
(15) Ci -> K + NP.
K generates a preposition, postposition, or case affix. One
could generalize this notion to a Kasus function, which maps a
deep structure proposition into a surface structure clause with
possible word order changes.
Fillmore shows by example the deep case markers (Kasus
functions) of various languages. He also gives some tentative
rules for English. For example (1968, pp. 32-33):
The A preposition is by; the I preposition is by if
there is no A, otherwise it is with; the 0 and F
[factitive case] prepositions are typically zero; the B
[benefactive case] preposition is for; the D [dative
case] preposition is typically to . . .
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If there is an A it becomes the subject; otherwise, if
there is an I, it becomes the subject; otherwise, the
subject is the 0.
Fillmore makes an argument for deep case relations in
analyzing verbs of any language, including English. He has
proposed several systems which capture various aspects of the
meaning of certain verbs. An example of his case systems appears
in Table 1. In addition to these cases, there are also other
relations "that identify the limits and extents in space and time
that are required by verbs of motion, location, duration, etc."
(Fillmore, 1971, p. 376).
Insert Table 1 about here.
-~------------- -----
Case Sequence Paradigms
Celce-Murcia (1972) developed a model for cases that
emphasizes the fact that cluster of verbs appear to take similar
sequences of cases. Her system is based on five deep case
relations: causal-actant, theme, locus, source, and goal. Verbs
are classified into paradigms according to the case sequences
they allow. For example, the ergative paradigm consists of the
sequences (for the active voice):
(causal-a'cantl, theme, causal-actant2)
(causal-actant1, theme)
(causal-acrant2, theme)
(theme)
Note that a paradigm consists of both the case structure for
the verb and constraints on the order of the case fillers. For
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example, the ergative paradigm says that the theme can never
precede the causal-actant.
"Break" is an example of an ergative verb. Thus,
(16) John broke the widow with a hammer.
(17) John broke the window.
(18) The hammer broke the window.
(19) The window broke.
are all well-formed since in each sentence one of the case
sequences is matched (where "John" is the causal-actantl,
"window" is the theme, and "hammer" is the causal-actant2).
Another example is the reflexive-deletion paradigm, in which
the theme is deleted if it matches the causal-actanti. Thus
"run" may be used in several ways:
(20) John ran to school.
(21) John ran a machine.
(22) The machine ran.
(23) The brook ran.
In each of the sentences there is a theme--John, machine, or
brook. The paradigm allows the deletion of the theme if it is
the same as the causal-actant. Thus the paradigm is
(causal-actant, goal)
(causal-actant, theme)
(theme).
Discourse Analysis
Grimes (1972) has developed a case system to serve as a
foundation for discourse analysis. The definitions of the cases
and their organization reflect his concern with event and episode
representations. Grimes distinguishes between two kinds of
generic events each with its own set of roles or deep cases.
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Motion/position events have orientation roles and changes of
state have process roles. In addition, the agent and benefactive
roles are common to all events. These cases are shown in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here.
The following examples illustrate the use of these cases:
(24) The letter (0) fell to the floor (G).
(25) His house (0) is situated on top of a hill (R).
(26) The tide (V) floated the oil slick (0) into the harbor (G).
(27) This idea (0) came to me (G) from Austin Hale (S).
(28) This book (P) costs three dollars (Rf).
(29) She (A) makes dresses (P Re) from flour sacks (P H).
(30) Fred (A) fixed the engine (P) with this screwdriver (I).
(31) Sally (A) handed John (G) the biscuits (0).
(32) He (A) parted the rope (P G) with an axe (0 I).
(33) The girl (P) died of malaria (F).
(34) The milk (P) turned sour on me (B).
(35) We (A) talked about politics (Rf).
(36) A breeze (0) came to him (G) from the sea (R).
The cases Grimes distinguishes are strongly influenced by
linguistic, not conceptual, considerations, e.g., in (27) the
transfer of the idea is not a physical movement. Sentence (27)
has the same surface form as (36), which is a description of a
physical transfer, so the two have similar case assignments.
Grimes also suggests the possibility of a more tightly
defined role structure based on certain similarities in the
roles: "The roles set up for orientation all have counterparts
on the process side, and vice versa. Both kinds could be
considered complementary variants of a single set of roles * * .
Object and patient both identify what is affected, the one in
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terms of motion or position and the other in terms of change of
state in a process" (Grimes, 1972). These observations suggest
the combined role structure shown in Figure 3.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Conceptual Cases
Schank's (1971, 1973, 1974, 1975) cases, unlike those of
Fillmore (1968) or Celce-Murcia (1972) are purely conceptual. Neither
the primitive act nor its cases need be explicitly mentioned in
an utterance. Instead, the argument for conceptual cases depends
upon considerations of the pragmatics of human communication.
One postulates a conceptual case because it is a relation
relevant to the typical kinds of tasks which people address via
language.
An essential element of most communication is the
description of actions. Our knowledge of actions implies a
"conceptual structure" built out of actions and their role
fillers:
ACTORS perform ACTIONS
ACTIONS have OBJECTS
ACTIONS have INSTRUMENTS
ACTIONS may have RECIPIENTS
ACTIONS may have DIRECTIONS. (Schank, 1974, p. 6)
One kind of conceptual structure or "conceptualization"
comprises an act, with its "actor," and the relations "object,"
"direction," and either "recipient," or "instrument." Each of
Deep Case SystemsDeep Case Systems
20
these relations must be present (except that only one of
direction or recipient is present).
Schank argues that a small number of concepts corresponding
to "primitive acts" can be used to construct meaning
representations for most descriptions of events. These primitive
concepts are simple actions of the kind "move a body part"
(MOVE), "build a thought" (MBUILD), "transfer a physical object"
(PTRANS), and "transfer mental information" (MTRANS). The
primitive ACTS together with the conceptual cases are the
components of meaning representation with a "unique
representation" feature: "We have required of our representation
that if two sentences, whether in the same or different language
are agreed to have the same meaning, they must have identical
representations" (Schank, 1974, p. 4). It is questionable
whether such a criterion can be met non-trivially. Do distinct
utterances (by different speakers using different phrasings, at
different times, in different situations) share significant
portions of a conceptual network? Furthermore, a non-redundant
representation such as Schank's raises serious questions of both
psychological validity and efficiency for diverse tasks.
Nevertheless, in many cases the mapping of utterances to
conceptualizations seems to be exactly the process which humans
exhibit. The unique representation also facilitates general
inferencing by reducing the number of cases to be considered:
The use of such primitives severely reduces the
inferences problem in Al . . . since inference rules need
only be written once for any ACT rather than many times
for each verb that references that ACT. For example,
one rule is that if you MTRANS something to your LTM
[long term memory], then it is present there (i.e., you
know it). This is true whether the verb of MTRANSing
was see, hear, inform, remember or whatever. The
inference comes from the ACT rather than the verb.
(Schank, 1974 p. 10)
Conclusion
The notion of case has evolved from an account of noun
affixes to an account of how syntactic relations between NPs and
sentences map into deep relations between objects and events.
These ideas have been applied to natural language processing for
semantic checking and meaning representation.
In many language systems, a case frame is associated with
each verb (and sometimes nouns). In recognizing the syntactic
role of an NP in a sentence, the parser uses the case frame to
verify that the semantic properties of the NP are consistent with
some case which can occur in that syntactic position. This
process can be usad to block a parse path, to reject a sentence
as ungrammatical, and to identify constraints for an ellipsed item
or the referent of a pronoun.
21
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Deep case systems are also an attempt to identify a fixed
number of conceptual roles which can be used to describe any
event. Representing deep cases as binary relations thus provides
a formalization of the meaning of a sentence. This structure for
describing knowledge has led to extensive research on semantic
networks for knowledge representation. Out of this research,
standard techniques for parsing and understanding have evolved to
the extent that most current natural language systems incorporate
these techniques in some form.
An important aspect of any case system is an account of how
the deep cases are realized in a sentence. Many issues related
to this accounting remain unresolved, such as whether an NP can
have multiple cases (Jackendoff, 1972), and how to capture the
regularities in the way the cases are realized (Levin, 1985).
Although case grammar per se is not a major focus of current
research within artificial intelligence, issues such as these are
actively pursued in related work on schema theory, relational
grammar, lexical functional grammar, generalized phrase structure
grammar, and semantic grammar.
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Table 1: Fillmore's (1971) case system
Agent(A)
Counter-
Agent(C)
Object(O)
Result(R)
Instrument(I)
Source(S)
Goal(G)
Experience(E)
the instigator of the event
the force or resistance against which the action is carried out
the entity that moves or changes or whose position or existence is
in consideration
the entity that comes into existence as a result of the action
the stimulus or immediate physical cause of an event
the place from which something moves
the place to which something moves
the entity which receives or accepts or experiences or undergoes
the effect of an action
Table 2: Grime's (1972) case system
Orientation poles:
Object(O) the thing whose position or motion is being described
Source(S) the location of the object at the beginning of a motion
Goal(G) the location of the object at the end of a motion
Range(R) the path or area traversed during a motion
Vehicle(V) the thing which conveys the object and moves along with it
Process Roles:
Patient(P) the thing changed by a process or the thing whose state is being
described
Material(M) the thing changed by a process in its state before the change
Result(Re) the thing changed by a process in its state after the change
Referent(Rf) the field or object which defines the limitation of a process (as
opposed to the thing affected by the process)
The Agentive Complex:
Agent(A) the one who is responsible for an action
Instrument(I) the tool used in performing an action
Force(F) the noninstigative cause of an action
The Benefactive Role:
Benefactive(B) the someone or something on whom an action has a secondary
effect
Figure Captions
Figure 1. A traditional phrase structure parse for
"Susan kicked the football with her foot."
Figure 2. A case oriented parse for "Susan kicked the
football with her foot".
Figure 3. Interrelationships among roles (Grimes, 1972).
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Orientation -> Combined
A agent I
I Fc force
I instrument I
V vehicle -- > V vehicle
0 object -- > P patient <-- P patient
S source -- > F former <-- M material
G goal -- > L latter <-- Rs result
R Range -- > R range <-- Rf referent
B benefactive
Process


